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We (mankind) are facing
• Huge dangers!
• Great opportunities!
• At the same time!
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Compared to 100 yrs ago
• The danger that the whole of mankind may
become extinct within either 100 yrs or 1,000
yrs has increased by at least 10 times.
• Nuclear wars, global warming, other
environmental disasters, misuse of technology
(e.g. nanotechnology), etc.
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But, if we managed to avoid extinction
• Almost certainly (>99%) increase our welfare
(net happiness) by >100 times in 100 yrs, and
>1,000 times in 1,000 yrs!

• By brain stimulation (BS) of
pleasure centres.
• By genetic engineering (GE).
• Expected welfare still higher.
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We are at the cross road of
• Jumping into Hell (extinction)
• Leaping into Heaven (bliss).
• 跳下地狱？走上天堂？
人类面临灭亡与极乐十字路口
• The huge difference never been bigger.
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The fruits of
• BS could be achieved in 5 yrs,
• from the start of a project to
promote its widespread use.
• GE within 10‐100 yrs.
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• Positive reward of BS was discovered by Olds
and Milner (1954) .
• Rats willing to cross a painful shock grid to
obtain BS.
• pleasure so intense, rats prefer BS to food and
sex, and if not stopped, will seek stimulation til
exhaustion.
• Humans, ‘patients [with] emotional or physical
pain experienced such intense pleasure with
stimulation that the pain was obliterated’
(Heath, John and Fontana 1968, p.188).
8

BS as a ‘primer’ of well‐being
• Heath (1964, p.236) reported, ‘strong
pleasure [from brain stimulation] was
associated with sexual feelings, and in most
instances the patient experienced
spontaneous orgasm … This patient, now
married to her third husband, had never
experienced orgasm before she received …
stimulation to the brain, but since then has
consistently achieved climax during sexual
relations.’
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Solving social problems
• Social problems as drug addiction, crimes and
(mental) depression, etc. largely solvable with
the widespread use of BS.
• In comparison to BS, the use of addictive
drugs like heroin is a very inefficient and
dangerous method of achieving a ‘high’.
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Addiction?
• BS addiction is not dangerous to health.
• Strong evidence: proper use (Patterson and
Kesner 1981) of BS over a sustained period for
a long time (few hours daily over years) has
proved quite safe. (See also Bolognini， et al.
2009，Deuschl, et al. 2006，Lozano, et al.
2008, Weaver, et al. 2009, Nitsche, et al. 2008,
Wassermann， et al. 2008.)

• Limit use to 7‐10pm?
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• Rats choose to use EBS until exhaustion but
humans only for “up to half an hour daily”
(Sem‐Jacobsen, in Delgado 1976, p.484).
• Relative to other pleasures and objectives, the
pleasure of BS not compelling for humans
(Bishop, Elder and Heath, 1964; Valenstein,
1973, p.28).
• Perhaps God made us this way so we could
eventually provide happiness not only for
ourselves but also for animals.
12

Beauty of BS
• 1. No loss of novelty value
like TV, etc.
• 2. No diminishing marginal
utility.
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Unnatural?
• 300 yrs ago: sitting in the living
room for hours looking at the
shadows in a box.
• All civilized things are ‘unnatural’.
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Will God approve BS?
• If I were God, I would want my
creatures to enjoy.
• No commandment against BS.
• If not why create us this way?
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• 详见财经网，黄有光博客：
• http://blog.caijing.com.cn/
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Genetic Engineering
• 主要增加粮产, 医药治疗 .
•
•
•
•
•

长期：改造我们自己。
快乐水平大致基因决定 。
多消费不能增加快乐，乐极生悲.
选择乐观、外向等基因。
直接减低痛苦，提高快乐水平 ；

• 改良健康，提高智力，延长寿命。
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Yes, have to be very careful
• With sufficient safeguard, the danger of
extinction or comparable disasters <
• The danger of extinction of ‘business as usual’
without serious attempts to address
environmental protection
• The difference of benefits are many
thousands times!
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Huge happiness potential
• Should increase our willingness to
sacrifice current consumption to
safeguard our survival.
• A point missed by current environmental
economics which concentrates on
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Consumption Tradeoff
• Stern 2007 Review, Nordhaus 2007 and Weitzman
2007 JEL reviews, Cole 2008, Dietz & Stern 2008,
Sterner & Persson 2008, Heal 2009, etc. emphasizes
the discount rate.
• A million dollars 200 years from now has a present
value of $59,618 discounted at 1.4% p.a. (used in
the Stern Review);
• Only $35 discounted at 5% (a rate commonly used);
• A difference of 1,700 times! Reject Stern?
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vs. Catastrophes Avoidance
• Focusing on the more important issue of
catastrophes avoidance, urgent and strong
actions may well be justified more.
• Happiness studies and technological advances
reinforce the need for strong actions.
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Ramsey’s approach
• maximizes social welfare or the utility of a
representative individual through time to
infinity as a function of the consumption level
of the contemporaneous period only.
• Ramsey’s equation for the discount rate r:
• r = δ + ηg
• where δ = rate of pure time preference, η =
elasticity of marginal utility (% decrease in MU
as consumption ↑ by 1%), and g = per capita
growth rate of consumption.
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Time preference
• An individual may be
myopic/impatient/irrational and has a positive
pure time preference.
• Global warming: perspective is the whole
society for both the present and future.
• Impartiality requires: welfare of future people
treated similarly to the present (Ng 2005).
• No pure time preference should be entailed.
• A valid reason for δ to be positive.
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Future utility is less certain
• A discount rate to reflect this uncertainty is
fully justified even with impartiality between
the present and the future (Ng 2005).
• “Intergenerational impartiality: Replacing
discounting by probability weighting”, Journal
of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics,
2005, 18(3), pp 237-57.
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What rate?
• The Stern Review adopts an annual uncertainty
discount rate δ = 0.1%.
• Many regard this rate as being too low or prefer
using higher rates. (See, e.g. Nordhaus 1994,
2007; Quiggin, forthcoming; Yohe 2006. A rate
of δ as high as 3% has been suggested.)
• In my view, as the (constant, for simplicity) rate
of pure survival uncertainty, the rate of δ = 0.1%
is VERY excessive.
• Should be at least ten times smaller: δ < 0.01%.
25

Annual Risk of Extinction
and Survival Probability
Annual value of δ

Probability of
Survival till
next

δ = 1%

δ = 0.1%

δ = 0.01%

100 years

36.6%

90.48%

99.005%

1,000 years

0.004%

36.77%

90.48%

2,000 years

(10-6) ∙ 0.186%

13.52%

81.87%

5,000 years

(10-19) ∙ 0.15%

0.672%

60.65%

8,000 years

(10-32) ∙ 0.12%

0.0334%

44.93%

10,000 years

(10-41) ∙
0.225%
Virtually zero

0.004517%

36.79%

(10-41) x 0.35385 %

0.0045377%

100,000 years
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Our history
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Earth: 4.5 billion years.
Life on earth: 3.5 - 4 billion years.
Mammals: 200 million years ago.
Primates: 40 million years.
Great apes: 15 million.
Homo: 2.5 million years.
Homo sapiens: half a million years.
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An important distinction.
• The higher probability of extinction due to
factor (such as celestial collision) unrelated to
global warming should increase our uncertainty
discount rate δ and hence decrease our
willingness to sacrifice our present consumption
for future benefits.
• The higher probability of extinction due to
global warming itself should increase our
willingness to sacrifice our present consumption
to avoid or reduce global warming.
• Because our sacrifice will help to reduce the
probabilities of extinction.
28

• For measures that help to reduce/avoid
catastrophes, δ should not be taken as given.
• Largely ignored in most analyses.
• If δ is taken as given, the problem is simply
intertemporal consumption trade-off. Then, the
higher the uncertainty discount rate δ, the less
willing we should be to sacrifice current
consumption for future consumption.
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Ramsey’s equation for discounting
• r = δ + ηg
• η = elasticity of marginal utility (% decrease
in MU as consumption ↑ by 1%),
• Diminishing marginal utility → the higher the
consumption level, the lower MU. The higher
growth rate g, the higher will future
consumption be higher than the present one.
• Thus, ηg gives how much lower MU of
consumption is less than that of a year before.
[intertemporal comparability and unchanged
utility function].
30

What values?
• The Stern Review takes δ = 0.1%, η = 1, and
g = 2%, giving a discount rate of r = 2.1%.
• Most commentators regard this as too small.
• Nordhaus (2007, p. 694) prefers a rate of 5.5%
(from δ = 1.5%, η = 2, and g = 2%);
• Weitzman (2007, p. 707) prefers a rate of 6%
( ‘a trio of twos’, i.e. δ = 2%, η = 2, g = 2%).
• As an uncertainty discount, even δ = 0.1% is
excessively high.
31

η = 1; too low
• total utility goes to infinity as
consumption does. Obviously impossible
as no one is capable of infinite happiness
no matter how high is consumption, due to
biological limitations.
• Weitzman (2007, p. 707) finds η = 3
reasonable. This, even with δ = 0, still
gives r = 6% (with g = 2%).
• Is g = 2% reasonable?
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Table 2
The number of times future output will be larger
Annual g = 1%

Annual g = 2%

100 years

2.7048

7.245

200 years

7.316

52.485

500 years

144.77

19,956.57

1,000 years

20,959.16

108 ∙ 3.98265

2,000 years

108 ∙ 4.39286

1017 ∙ 1.58615

5,000 years

1021 ∙ 4.04454

1043 ∙ 1.00198

10,000 years

1043 ∙ 1.63583

1086 ∙ 1.003963

20,000 years

1086 ∙ 2.676

10172 ∙ 1.00794

After
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• Growth may consist in services and leisure.
• Still, with productivity in the order of 10 to the power
172 times that of our current one implies that a single
worker would be able to produce the value of output
many quintillion times more than the value of the
weight of the whole universe in gold in less than a tiny
fraction of a second!
• Optimist as I am, I do not think that this would ever be
possible, not to say in 20,000 years from now. Thus,
economic growth may be at the level of 2-3% for
many more decades; it must eventually slow down.
Taking g = 2% indefinitely is thus misleading.
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• Some truncate the time horizon, looking say at
only the next one or two hundred years.
• Though the probability that we will survive
more than two hundred years should be much
higher than 50%, this simplification is not too
misleading, if the problem is just that of
intertemporal consumption tradeoff, especially
if the discount rate is around or more than the
more common value of about 5%.
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• A stream of value worth $100 in real terms from
the year 201 every year through to infinity,
discounted at 5%, has only a present value of
$0.1156 in total!
• This underlines the misleading nature of focusing
on intertemporal consumption tradeoff for
problems like global warming that have longlasting effects and that may lead to catastrophic
outcomes threatening our very survival.
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• Weitzman (2007) correctly mentions that,
in dealing with global warming, the
expected growth rate should have ‘a thick
left tail’ (p.718);
• but acknowledges that ‘we lack a usable
economic framework for dealing with
these kinds of thick-tailed extreme
disasters’ (p.723). Weitzman (2009).
• The next section outlines a method in
dealing with such catastrophes.
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Towards an Economic Analysis of
Catastrophes Avoidance
• Nearly two decades ago, I discussed ‘decisions
(e.g. ... environmental protection…) that may
affect the probabilities of the continued
survival of the human race’ (Ng 1991, p.79).
• “Should We Be Very Cautious or Extremely
Cautious on Measures that May Involve Our
Destruction? On the Finiteness of Our
Expected Welfare”, Social Choice and Welfare,
1991, 8(1): 79-88.
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• Traditional economics, especially with the
insistence on ordinal utility, cannot
analyse catastrophes
• Which requires the comparisons of total
utilities/welfares with marginal utilities.
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3 Methods
• 1. Estimate willingness to pay to reduce
risk of death by observing actual choices.
• 2. By asking people.
• 3. From postulated cardinal
utility/happiness functions.
• Economists skeptical of the last two.
• Behavioural economics.
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Happiness studies
• Results in happiness studies provide
some clues.
• Suggest high value of total utilities
relative to marginal utilities.
• Hence justities immediate and strong
actions to reduce global warming.
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Crux of the difference
• Consumption in the far future very
unimportant as r should be large (5%).
• Very important to avoid/reduce
catastrophes as expected future welfare
(total utility) very high,

• And pure uncertainty discount δ
should be very low (< 0.01%).
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An Illustration
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• “Business as usual”: EU1 = 151.34 +
97.24 + 3,208.87 = 3,458.45
• Consumption trade-off only: EU2 =
131.18 + 94.24 + 3,211.33 = 3,316.75
• Catastrophes reduction: EU3 = 126.04 +
93.87 + 9,751.07 = 9.860.98.
• Potential strong support for immediate and
strong actions at environmental protection.
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Future Technological Advances
• Such as brain stimulation, genetic
engineering discussed above
• That may lead to quantum leaps in
our welfare
• Further reinforce the results of
happiness studies.
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May we save ourselves from our
own destruction!

Thank you!
•刺激大脑，享受人生极乐；
•改良基因，打开生死玄关。
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